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Abstract
This Article documents the patterns of judicial divergence in the area of non-derogable rights.
It examines the increased conservatism of the European Court of Human Rights relative to other
international bodies in one specific area; the interpretation and protection of human rights violations in situations of emergency. This Article explores the responses of international courts and
tribunals to situations where states have limited the exercise of their citizens’ rights as a result of
political crisis. These limitations are examined in relation to the agreed obligations of states to
protect rights when they sign human rights treaties. Part I looks at the pivotal role of the European
Court and Commission of Human Rights. Case by case analysis reveals that both institutions have
developed state focused doctrines at the expense of protecting individual rights. Part II recounts
how the Inter-American Court, in its short history, has shown greater willingness to confront state
violations of rights in situations of political instability where the state argues that it is justified by
the crisis in limiting its international obligations. Part II also examines the multi-layered thinking
of the Court, its mechanisms for interlinking different rights as a means of compounding protection for the individual citizen. Part III looks at the Human Rights Committee of the United
Nations. Part III suggests that, despite its burden of inter-state political wrangling and its disadvantages of limited procedural accessibility, it has functioned reasonably well in confronting state
obligations in situations of emergency. This Article concludes that more attention must be paid
to the similarities and differences in jurisprudence emerging from different international tribunals.
Equally, it strongly re-enforces the dangers of failing to pay due regard to the political leanings of
judges monitoring state obligations in international courts. Ultimately, it points to the danger of
assuming that a vision of universal human rights goals will be realized without active oversight of
the judicial branch.

THE EMERGENCE OF DIVERSITY:
DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
FionnualaNi Aolain*
INTRODUCTION
There is substantial evidence that significant divergence has
emerged in the standards and application of certain fundamental human rights norms by international courts and tribunals.

Such divergence in standards is problematic on a number of
levels. The standardization of human rights norms is central to
the vision of universalized rights, 'valid across borders, and despite cultural differences.' The focus of this Article is not the
textual differences in defining rights between the different regional human rights treaties and the International Bill of
Rights.' Rather, the scrutiny is on an emerging conceptual, as
well as a practical, divergence between the different international courts and tribunals adjudicating human rights violations.
Judicial interpretation of regional and international human
rights standards is central to the articulation and understanding
of the rights contained therein. As a practical matter, human
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. I-would like to thank Professor Louis
Henkin of Columbia Law School, Professor Henry Steiner of Harvard Law School, Dr
Coim Campbell of the Queens University Belfast, Professor Martin Flaherty of Fordham
Law School, Oren Gross S.J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School and John Wadham,
Legal Officer at the National Council for Civil Liberties in London for helpful comments and support. I am grateful to the Civil Liberties Trust Studentship at Queens
University, Belfast and the Fulbright Commission for providing the support to facilitate
this work. My thanks also to the Harvard Human Rights program for providing a quiet
space in which to gather my thoughts.
1. See, e.g., PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1983);
EvAN LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1967); Louis HENIUN,
THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY

(1978).

2. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
OAS.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.LM. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
OA.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/REV. 5 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 59; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1977 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702).
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rights treaties become meaningful when they are interpreted by
judges providing remedies to states and individuals.
In the areas of derogation from enunciated rights in international treaties and the protection of non-derogable rights, international judicial approaches demonstrate a lack of coherence
and common vision. Derogation refers to the legally mandated
right of states to allow suspension of certain international obligations protecting individual rights in circumstances of emergency
or war.3 Non-derogable rights are those specially protected
rights under treaty law that cannot be limited or suspended;
notwithstanding any political crisis that the state faces.4 Disparity in judicial decision-making by international courts can result
in confusion as to the scope and meaning of particular rights,
with a corresponding lessening of protection when violations occur. Disparity may undermine the consensus of the international community as to what constitutes a particular violation,
and the appropriate measures to be taken by the state to remedy
a grievance.
. This Article documents the patterns of judicial divergence
in the area of non-derogable rights. It examines the increased
conservatism of the European Court of Human Rights relative to
other international bodies in one specific area; the interpreta3. See Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRrr. Y.B. Irr'L
L. 281 (1976-77).
4. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 7. Article 15(2) of the European Convention illustrates how this protection
for particular rights prohibits reservations to specifically elevated rights:
No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this
provision.
Id.
The American Convention makes an interesting comparison, as the selection of
non-derogable rights is more wide-reaching and expansive than its European counterpart. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(2), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 9 I.L.M. at
683.* Article 27(2) provides:
The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following
articles: Article 3(Right to juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right of Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article
9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and
Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name),
Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article
23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
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tion and protection of human rights violations in situations of
emergency.' A state of emergency refers to those exceptional
circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a political nature, which, to varying degrees, involve extreme and imminent
danger that threaten the organized existence of the state and
the population contained therein.6
Varied approaches to fundamental rights by similarly situated international courts are problematic for the world rights
community. The European Court of Human Rights shoulders a
heavy duty in this respect. As the oldest and most accessible forum responsible for the examination of individual rights violations, the European Court is a standard bearer for the creation
of regional rights enforcement instruments, and effective implementation mechanisms.7 The Court and Commission are viewed
5. See SUBRATA Roy CHOWDHURy, RuLE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY (1989)

(presenting exhaustive and scholarly exegesis on International Law Association's Paris
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in State of Emergency); Study on the Implicationsfor Human Rights of Recent Developments ConcerningSituationsKnown as States of Siege
or Emergency, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 35th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 4-43,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/15 (1982); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, STATES OF
EMERGENCY- THEIR IMPACT ON HuMAN RIGHTS (1983);JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMER-

GENCY (1994); Higgins, supra note 3; Joan F. Hartman, Derogationfimn Human Rights

Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1981).
6. See Study on the Implicationsfor Human Rights of Recent Developments ConcerningSituations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, supra note 5, at 8. The definition is oversimplified and is less sharply defined than the descriptions outlined in some European
Court decisions, specifically the test established in Lawless v. Ireland. See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55 (1961) [hereinafter Lawless]. The definition is intended to indicate the broad parameters within which the concept of emergency lies.
The term "emergency" varies according to the judicial system being examined. The
following terms equally describe the phenomena: state of siege, situation of exigency,
state of alert, situation of internal war, martial law, special powers and suspension of
guarantees. Situations of emergency can arise for various reasons, including: (a) serious political crisis (internal armed conflict of a scale that threatens political governance), (b) Force majeure (natural and other disasters of various kinds), and (c) economic
circumstances (specifically chronic underdevelopment).
7. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 8-9. Article 25 of the Convention confers a broad right of individual petition:
(1) The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has
declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such
petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
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as the models of regional rights enforcement procedures.8 They
offer the possibility of effective redress to the victims of state
human rights abuses and place direct responsibility on the state
to ensure enforcement of consensually entered international obligations.9
The new world envisioned in the creation of the European
Convention is being diminished by political expediency and judicial unwillingness to take democratic states to task for rights
violations in situations of political crisis. This fact is most apparent when rights violations are balanced against issues of state se-.
curity and the sovereignty premise inherent in maintaining the
political status quo. Combined with this state-centered dogma is
an approach to interpretation, characterized by dodging the
clarification of rights, usually to minimize their content, when
competing interests create difficulties of adherence for member
states to the Convention.
Judicial power in the European system has a tangible existence. This power is in part created by the nature of the European Convention itself."0 It is a generally framed document,
leaving ample scope for judges to apply, manipulate, and creatively interpret its provisions. The judges themselves recognize
this fact." The Tyrer case,' 2 which concerned the infliction of
Id.
By Autumn 1994, thirty of the thirty-two Member States of the Council of Europe
had ratified the Convention, had recognized the competence of the Commission to
receive individual applications, and had recognized the competence of the Court to
adjudicate. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the ControlMachinery Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 144, 146 (1995); see also W.
Paul Gormley, The ProceduralStatus of the Individual Before SupranationalJudicial Tribunals, 41 U. DET. L. REv. 282 (1964) (discussing status of individuals before international
legal tribunals).

8. Heribert I. Golsong, The European Commission of Human Rights, 2 CoN. J. INT'L
L. 285 (1987); Brian Walsh, The European Court of Human Rights, 2 CON'N.J. INT'L L. 271
(1987); J.A. Andrews, The EuropeanJurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463
(1984); F.JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CoNrNIoN ON HuMAN RIGHTS (1975); A.H. ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE
EUROPE (1993).

(2d ed. 1977);

RALPH BEDDARD,

HuMAN

RIGHTS AND

9. See generally Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal,20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 588-592 (1987) (providing brief synopsis of advantages of regional human rights systems).
10. European Convention, supra note 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
11. See Colder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1975) [hereinafter Golder]. The birching violation concerned the refusal of the prison governor, in the
prison that held the applicant, to allow the applicant to write to his Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom or to consult with his legal representative. Golder, 18 Eur.
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birching as a form of corporal punishment on a fifteen-year old
schoolboy, illustrates the point.'" The European Court of
Human Rights confirmed that "the Convention is a living instrument which.., must be interpreted in the light of the presentday conditions." 4
Judicial power poses two distinct problems in the context of
emergency situations. First, the Court fails to remember that it is
the defender of rights, not of governments. Exacting standards
of human rights enforcement send a direct signal to governments and the world community that violation is intolerable,
and that exceptions that allow coercive state action are limited
and closely monitored. The alternative signal, if high standards
of application are missing, is that signing a human rights convention is a window dressing exercise. In such a case, the state is
given a wide measure of tolerance in its behavior towards its citizens. Second, the fluidity of the interpretative process, leaves an
indeterminate power with the judicial branch. This power has
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9. A violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention was alleged. Id.
The Court's manipulation of language is evident. The majority opinion found that
while Article 6(1) "does not state a right of access to the courts or tribunals in express
terms," the language of the article had to be interpreted in light of the "rule of law"
mentioned in both the preamble to the Convention, and the Statute of the Council of
Europe. Id. at 13. Golder also confirms that the majority of the court sought to construct the Convention in a manner that filled the gaps, which those who negotiated the
Convention could not have intended or envisaged. Id. at 17.18. The dynamic element
ofjudicial response is best illustrated by the manner in which the Court has responded
to changing European social and moral norms. See also Marckx v. Belgium, 29 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1980) [hereinafter Marckx] The case concerned the application of Article 8 of the Convention to a case alleging discrimination against an illegitimate child.
Marckx, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42. Though Article 8(1) explicitly states that the
Convention ensures respect for everyone's private and family life, the Court rightly decided that the concept of family life encompassed the relationship between an illegitimate child and its natural relatives. Id. at 84. The court also recognized that the Convention binds the signatory European states together in a manner that is quite unique.
Id. In the dissenting opinion of Wemhoff v. Federal Republic of Germany, 6 Eur. Ct.H.R.
(ser. A) (1968) [hereinafter Wemhoff,Judge Zekia from Cyprus recognized that European countries are "likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions,
ideals, freedom and rule of law." Wemhoff, 1 Eur. 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (quoting
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
The case concerned the delay in the determination of criminal charges, an alleged
violation of Article 6(1). Id. at 6. This early recognition of the commonality of laws and
practices binding European states set the stage for the Court to later transcend the
particular limitations imposed by national legal regimes.
12. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
13. 7srr,26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6-7.
14. Id. at 10.
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been insufficiently exercised in favor of limiting state prerogatives in opposition to strengthening individual protection in situations of exigency.
This Article explores the responses of international courts
and tribunals to situations where states have limited the exercise
of their citizens' rights as a result of political crisis. These limitations are examined in relation to the agreed obligations of states
to protect rights when they sign human rights treaties. Part I
looks at the pivotal role of the European Court and Commission
of Human Rights. Case by case analysis reveals that both institutions have developed state focused doctrines at the expense of
protecting individual rights. Part II recounts how the InterAmerican Court, in its short history, has shown greater willingness to confront state violations of rights in situations of political
instability where the state argues that it is justified by the crisis in
limiting its international obligations. Part II also examines the
multi-layered thinking of the Court, its mechanisms for interlinking different rights as a means of compounding protection
for the individual citizen. Part III looks at the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations. Part III suggests that, despite
its burden of inter-state political wrangling and its disadvantages
of limited procedural accessibility, it has functioned reasonably
well in confronting state obligations in situations of emergency.
This Article concludes that more attention must be paid to the
similarities and differences in jurisprudence emerging from different international tribunals. Equally, it strongly re-enforces
the dangers of failing to pay due regard to the political leanings
of judges monitoring state obligations in international courts.
Ultimately, it points to the danger of assuming that a vision of
universal human rights goals will be realized without active oversight of the judicial branch.
I. SITUATIONS OF EMERGENCY
Situations of emergency are a clear starting point for the
discussion of the role of international courts. In recent decades,
many states have been faced with situations of internal disorder
and crisis.1" Internal political strife poses immense problems for
S15. See Remember, Remember 17 November, OBSERVER, Mar. 13, 1994, at 40 (reporting
twentieth anniversary of Greek terrorist organization that was formed following Greek
coup); Celestine Bohlen, Mafia's Foes FearRome is Falering,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at
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constitutional and democratic order. 6 Human rights conventions have recognized the burden imposed upon the state by
threats to its stability. This is practically manifested by the dero17
gation articles incorporated into the European Convention,
the American Convention, t8 and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 9 These derogations allow states to limit the exercise of some rights protected by the instruments, within strict
limits for precise and definite ends."° Derogations are not limitless nor are they open-ended. Some fundamental rights cannot
be derogated from in any circumstances. 2' These rights are considered so basic and fundamental that no crisis justifies their removal or restriction. In the circumstances where derogation is
permitted, the Human Rights Conventions, 2 in theory, impose
A8 (reporting organized crime's undermining impact on Italian government); Separate
QuebecIllegal, CanadianLeader Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 1994, at A20 (reporting
active secessionist movement in Quebec, Canada); Inside Stoy: The Retreat of Terror,
GUARDIAN, May 13, 1995, at 32 (discussing extensive history of European terrorism).
16. See Hartman, supra note 5, at 2. Joan Hartman characterized this problem as
an "'uneasy compromise' between the protection of individual rights and the protection of 'national needs' in times of crisis." Id.
17. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 6-7; American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27, OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 9, 9
I.L.M. at 683; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 5.
18. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27, OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 9, 9 I.L.M. at
683.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 4, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 5.
20. See Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55. In its report on the case, the Commission stated: "The burden lies upon the state concerned to satisfy the Commission
that a measure derogating from the Convention was one strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency at the time when the measure was imposed." Id. at 114 (quoting
commission decision).
21. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232, Europ.
T.S. No. 5, at 7 (prohibiting derogation from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from
torture), 4 (freedom from slavery), and 7 (retrospective effect of penal legislation));
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 4(2), 999
U.N.T.S. at 174, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 23 (prohibiting derogation from Articles 6
(right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture), 8 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), 11
(imprisonment for failure to fulfill contractual obligation), 15 (prohibition on retrospective criminal offence), 16 (protection and guarantee of legal personality), and 18
(freedom of thought, conscience and religion); American Convention, supra note 2,
art. 27, OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 9, 9 I.LM. at 683 (prohibiting suspension of Articles 3
(right to juridical personality), 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 6 (freedom from slavery), 9 (freedom from ex-postfadto laws), 12 (freedom of conscience and
religion), 17 (right of the family), 18 (right to name), 19 (right of child), 20 (right to
nationality), and 23 (right to participate in government)).
22. See supra note 2 (setting forth several human rights conventions).
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both procedural and substantive requirements upon the state.

These requirements were envisaged as the sine quo non for accommodating the state need to deviate from the protection of
rights prescribed in the Conventions.2

The protection of rights becomes most significant when the
normal political order is threatened. When it is most difficult
for the state to protect rights, state adherence to external standards is most meaningful. Political turmoil exacerbates the fragility of protecting the individual against the actions of the state.
At this crucial moment, the role of international courts and
tribunals is pivotal. The history of the European Court in this
respect has not been heroic, with. less political context justification than the Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American
Court and Commission.
A. The European Response to Exigency
The European Convention system has been vaunted as the
most progressive, accessible, and developed human rights mech23. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 234, Europ.
T.S. No. 5, at 7. Article 15(3) of the European Convention requires that:
Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the SecretaryGeneral of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
Id. Article 27(3) of the American Convention provides that:
Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform the other State Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the reasons that gave rise to the suspension, and the date set for the
termination of such suspension.
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27(3), OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 9, 9 I.L.M. at 683.
Additionally, Article 4(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
requires the following procedural action by a derogating state party:
Any State Party to the present Convention availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other State Parties to the present Covenant,
through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of
the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was
actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 4(3), 999
U.N.T.S. at 174, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 23. The traveaux preparatoiresgive further
insight into the construction of the derogation clause and its procedural aspects. See
U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Agenda Item 28, Annexes, pt. II, Agenda Item 28, U.N. Doc. A/
2929 (1955).
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anism created since World War 11.24 This theme has pervaded
much of the commentary on the system, notwithstanding the critiques of individual decisions handed down by the Court and
Commission.2 5 Yet, its limitations are central to understanding
why the Court has performed so poorly in the area of rights protection in situations of emergency.
The limitations of the European system have been obscured
for two primary reasons. First, the sophisticated and relatively
efficient individual complaint mechanism has focused attention
on access rather than outcome in the protection of certain
rights. 6 Second, the Court and Commission developed a comprehensive jurisprudence marked by judicial fortitude, in areas
such as: (1) the relationship between the state and the private
life of the individual (non-interference);7 (2) the well-maintained due-process protection involving non-exigency situations;2a and (3) the disapproved and judicially sidestepped limi24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (citing favorable writings on European
enforcement procedures).
25. See Cora Feingold, The Little Red Schoolbook and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 3 HUM. RTrs. REV. 21 (1978) (discussing European Court of Human
Rights finding that London publisher's Article 10 right to freedom of expression was
not violated by domestic censorship, pursuant to Obscene Publications Act 1959-64);
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) [hereinafter Handyside].
26. See L.J. CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION 11-14 (1994) (presenting detailed account of European complaint system).
27. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980) [hereinafter
Dudgeon]. The Court ruled that a total prohibition on acts of sodomy and of gross
indecency between adult men under the laws of Northern Ireland constituted a breach
of the Article 8 right to private life. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18; Rees v.
United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) [hereinafter Rees]. Rees alleged
that the United Kingdom's refusal to register an altered birth certificate after a sexchange operation violated the Article 8 right to privacy. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 7-9. Rees represents the first of a series of cases which confirm states' obligations to
"respect" Article 8, beyond mere non-interference. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) [hereinafter Sunday Times]. In Sunday Times, the
Court found a violation of Article 10's protection of freedom of expression. Sunday
Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42. The case arose from an application by the English
Attorney-General for an injunction restraining publication of a newspaper article highly
critical of Distillers Company (Biochemicals) Ltd., who had manufactured and distributed the drug thalidomide in the United Kingdom. Id. at 8-12. The injunction was
removed by the English Court of Appeal and subsequently reinstated by the House of
Lords. Id. at 11.
28. Article 5 protection has been consistently strong. Note the cases relating to
the requirement of "promptness" in Article 5 (3). Decisions of the Commission include:
X v. Netherlands, 1966 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 565, 568; X v.
Belgium, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 224, 237; Brogan and
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tations on procedural access and unnecessary obstacles to effective remedies. 9
B. Legitimizing Scrutiny - The Lawless Case
The European Court and Commission have been faced with
issues surrounding political emergencies in Convention states on
numerous occasions.5 0 In the Lawless Case, the first case before
the Court, the bench was asked to examine the validity of derogation by the Government of the Irish Republic, resulting in the
detention without trial of the petitioner."1 Gerard Lawless was
arrested on July 11, 1957, in the Republic of Ireland. An Irish
citizen, he was arrested as a suspected member of the illegal Irish
Republican Army. Subsequent to his arrest, he was held from
July 13 to December 11 in an internment camp. 2 During his
detention, Lawless filed a complaint with the Commission alleging violation of his rights under Article 5 (individual freedom
and security), Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 7 (proscribing retroactive convictions) of the European Convention. The Irish
Government relied primarily on its right to derogate under Article 15 of the Convention, as3 the basis for justifying its prolonged
5
detention of the applicant.
While upholding the legality of the detention and confirming the validity of the derogation, the Court paid close attention
to the need for a thorough procedural and substantive examinaOthers v. United Kingdom, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-34 (1989) [hereinafter
Brogan]. See dejong, Bajet and van den Brink v. Netherlands, 77 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 22-25 (1984) [hereinafter deJon&Baljet and van den Brink].
29. See Inhabitants of Alsember and Beersel, Kraainem, Antwerp and Environs,
Ghent and Environs, Louvain and Environs, and Vilvorde v. Belgium, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1967) [hereinafter Belgium Linguistic Case (No. 1)] (reporting first stage of
judicial development of concept of effectiveness); Golder, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
The principle of effectiveness was employed as a means to imply a right not directly
mentioned in the Convention, the right of access to a Court. See COIN WARBRICK, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism, 32 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 82, 96-99 (1983) (providing full discussion of this manipulation).
30. Cyprus Case, 1958-59 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 174 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R);
Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 197 (indicating individual right to fair, public, and
expeditious judicial proceeding); Greek Case 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H. R. 1 (Eur.
Comm'n on H. R.); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) [hereinafter Ireland v. United Kingdom].
31. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 195.
32. See Harold Porter, Jr., The Lawless Case: A Beachheadfor Civil Rights, 49 A.BAJ.
79, 80 (1961).
33. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42.
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tion of the claim before it. The Court stated categorically, "it is
for the court to determine whether the conditions laid down in
Article 15 for the exercise of the exceptional right of derogation
have been fulfilled... "I The Court refused to relegate review
of the decision to derogate solely to the political discretion of
the state. The Court validated its right to examine. It expounded a definitive "right to scrutiny" doctrine in Lawless,
notwithstanding the strong state claim that the evaluation of an
emergency was within the "sole discretion of the Government
concerned." 5
Lawless was the first case before the Court examining a sensitive issue, and its outcome should not be characterized as a
complete failure. Despite a validation of the declared emergency, 6 Lawless went some way towards developing criteria to
factually evaluate whether a situation of emergency could be said
to exist or not. 7 The Lawless Case has similarities with the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Marbuy v. Madison, where the Court
asserted its right of review but did not find the Government in
breach." The majority Court view, in Lawless, expanded the
general criteria of Article 15(1), allowing derogation in circumstances including "other public emergency threatening the life
of the nation."" This was taken to include "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population
and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community
34. Id. at 55.
35. Affaire Lawless, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 225 1960-61) (Counter-memorial
of the Government of Ireland).
36. Law/ess, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55,
37. Id. In their report, the Commission determined that:
The natural and ordinary meaning of "a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation" is, we think, a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or
crisis affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and constituting a threat to the organized life of the community which composes the
State in question.
Id. at 82.
38. See Marbuiy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) (1803) (establishing that Court has
right of review, but not without first obtaining jurisdiction). See also Thomas A.
O'Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in theJurisprudenceof the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HuM. Rrs. Q. 474, 494-95 (1982). O'Donnell argues that
the Lawess Case must be viewed as a product of the uncertainties facing a Court making
its first decision, without the aid of earlier precedents and unsure if the state party
would follow its ruling. Id.
39. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232, Europ.
T.S. No. 5, at 6.
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of which the state is composed."4' In an otherwise limited judgement, Lawless gave some indication of the factual elements that
externally validate governmental resort to a state of emergency.
These included: the existence of an armed and illegal organization (in this case the Irish Republican Army); the violent activities being carried out by the subversive organization; and the
threat of increased violent activities within and outside the
state.41

In many ways, this case represents a high point of judicial
activism in this area. Nonetheless, it has been subjected to criticism.42 While the moral high-ground was occupied on the issue
of the courts being allowed to scrutinize, the substance of the
examination was made meaningless by the majority's unstated
use of the "margin of appreciation" doctrine. 43 Though the
Court did not specifically refer to the phrase, it emphasized its
significance by noting that the Irish Government "reasonably deduced" the existence of a public emergency." Ultimately, judicial deference to the states' assessment of risk (here the Republic of Ireland), was the stumbling block created and followed
with only one exception in subsequent derogation cases. The
sole exception was the examination by the Commission of the
case brought by the Governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway
and the Netherlands against the state of Greece, on October 2,
1967. 45
After Lawless, the Court and Commission had created the
40. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56.
41. Id.
42. Hartman, supra note 5, at 24-27. Hartman concludes that the "majority's stress
on the margin of appreciation underplayed the article 15 necessity of a threat to the
'life of the nation.'" Id. at 24 (referencing commission's decision). She further concludes that the "Court's terse opinion makes little use of the competing standards of
scrutiny." Id. at 26.
43. The origin of the margin of appreciation doctrine is found in the Cyprus Case.
Cyprus Case, 1958 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174-76 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). After declaring the application by Greece, admissible with respect to actions of deportation and
detention taken by the United Kingdom Government in Cyprus, the Commission noted
its willingness to extend to the derogating state "a certain measure of discretion in
assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." Id. at 176. This
doctrine has been subject to robust criticism. See Cora S. Feingold, Margin of Appreciation in Human Rights Law, in REvuE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 263 (1973).
44. See CHOWDHURY, supra note 5, at 32 (discussing Court's consideration of Irish

Government's reliance on multiple factors to conclude existence of public emergency).
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (citing cases deciding issues surrounding political emergencies in Convention states).
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platform of legitimate interest for scrutiny in emergency situations. They were in the position to secure a mechanism of accountability in extreme situations where external neutral examination could prove crucial to the protection of rights. The Greek
Case that followed close on the heels of Lawless gave some hope
that such a policy was indeed being pursued.' The application
brought by the four member states alleged that measures taken
by the Greek military government were in violation of the Convention.
On April 21, 1967, a group of military officers carried out a
successful coup d'etat in Greece. In the name of "The National
Revolution," constitutional guarantees protecting human rights
were suspended. Mass arrests, purges of the intellectual and
47
political community,' censorship, and martial law followed.
Glorified as a response to communism, the revolutionary government created a military dictatorship. In May 1967, the SecretaryGeneral of the Council of Europe was informed that Article 15
of the Convention was being invoked by military rulers to allow
for the suspension of certain constitutional rights.
Once applications were made, the Commission was faced
with making a factual evaluation based on the standards of allowable derogation under Article 15 as to whether a state of emergency actually existed in Greek territory. The Commission acknowledged the margin of appreciation doctrine,4" but rejected
the Government's contention, declaring that invoking an emergency was not justified.49 The Commission approach was
staunch in its assessment of the factors that may justify the calling of an emergency.50 This approach was strengthened by the
emphasis on independent fact-finding."1 The Commission Re46. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 2 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
47. James Beckett, The Gre k Case Before the European Human Rights Commission, 1

HUM. Ris. L.J. 91, 93-94 (1970-71).
48. Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 2 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
49. Cora S. Feingold, Note, The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 90, 91 (1977).
50. Report of the European Commission of Human Rights on the "Greek Case," 1969 Y.B.
Eur. Cony. on H.R. 75 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R).
51. See Hartman, supra note 5, at 37 ("The Commission has displayed an impressive capacity to handle large numbers of wimesses and massive amounts of conflicting
evidence in derogation cases."). Article 28(a) of the Convention authorizes the mechanism. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(a), 213 U.N.T.S. at 239, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 9. In the Greek Case, thirty-two witnesses testified on Article 15 issues. Hartman, supra note 5, at 37.
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port is characterized by objective assessment, non-deference to
state justification, and streamlining of categories within which to
assess state action.5 2 The Greek Case represents the sole deviation from the norm of non-interference.
53
The Greek application did not come before the Court.
Nonetheless, the case is the second peak in assessing the responses of Convention mechanisms to Article 15 derogation.
The downhill slide quickly followed. In retrospect, the approach
of the Commission has been contextualized as a response to the
anti-democratic character of the Greek Government.5 4 The
clear signal was that the use of the Convention and its processes
to legitimate usurping the democratic order was intolerable. In
the generally litigated area of democratic governments' resort to
emergency powers, the Commission and Court's response have
proved less robust.
C. Abdication of Responsibility
Where ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of certain rights guaranteed under the Convention, the
Commission and Court are less exacting in their requirements.
The leeway given to such states has been noticeably different.
Subjective political rationale are often deemed sufficient to satisfy the Convention mechanisms that derogation was justifi55
able.
52. Beckett, supra note 47, at 107-17.
53. The Commission transmitted its findings to the Committee of Ministers in November, 1968. The Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution to make the report on
Greece public. Subsequently, in December 1969, the Greek government denounced
the Convention. Under Convention procedure, such a denunciation operated to release Greece from its membership of the Convention as of 1970. Greece, however, reratified the Convention in 1974.
54. Beckett, supra note 47, at 113; see Hartrnan, supra note 5, at 29. "It was probably
the Commission's distrust of the motivations of the Greek military government and
revulsion against its anti-democratic character that explained the difference in the majority opinions in the Greek and Law/ess cases." Id, (citations omitted). CHOWDHURY,
supra note 5, at 38-39 (exploring relationship between legitimacy of government asserting derogation and subsequent validity of derogation itself).
55. See Brendan Mangan, ProtecingHuman Rights in National Emergencies: Shortcomings in the European System and a Proposalfor Reform, 10 HUM. RTs.

Q.

372, 383 (1988).

Mangan notes that "a democratic government that is reputed to make good faith efforts
to preserve human rights will be given a wider margin of appreciation than will a government with a lesser human rights reputation." Id. Other commentators have argued
that when a government is known to be sympathetic to democratic principles and the
rule of law, greater weight is given to their assessment that a situation requiring Article
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The margin of appreciation doctrine has been a crucial aspect of the retreat from substantive scrutiny. Allowing significant discretion to the derogating state has been the hallmark of
this concept, with the result that responses to emergency are
state focused, to the detriment of individual rights. One commentator argues that the approach of the Court in respect to the
doctrine is a striking illustration of judicial self-restraint. 56 It is
difficult to envisage the margin of appreciation as such in respect to its employment in emergency related derogations. As
the ensuing case discussion will reveal, there is ample evidence
of an abdication by the Court of its duties to guard against states'
undue resort to exigency. Equally evident is a failure to confront
the practice of state parties introducing temporary legislation
limiting rights protection to confront finite phenomena, thereby
allowing such legislation to become entrenched and survive as
integral components of state legal regulation.5 7
The consistent approach taken by the Court and Commission to frequent derogation by the United Kingdom is the prime
example to illustrate this point.5 8 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, 9
a complex series of detention measures applied in Northern Ireland to hundreds of detained persons were at issue before the
15 derogation exists. FRED CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

169 (Torkel Opsahl & Thomas Ouchterlony eds., 1974).
56. See Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism andJudicialSelf-Restraint in the European Court
of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTs. L. J. 57 (1990). Mahoney
argues that the doctrine operates as due deference to the elected representative body
underpinning the legal structure of the Convention. Id. at 58. It should be noted that
the author's discussion of the doctrine is linked to non-emergency cases, involving the
limitations on rights related to the cultural or social structure of member states. Id. at
76-85. Some argue, however, that the margin of appreciation doctrine, at least with
respect to these types of cases, is moving into a domain for which it was not intended
and for which it is ill-suited. Id. at 83-85.
57. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, 48 Halsbury
Stat. 972 (3d ed., 1978) (Eng.), is the classic example of this phenomena. The provisions establishing a seven day detention power are currently in force, notwithstanding
the one year military ceasefire by paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. Id.
South Africa's incorporation in 1986 of emergency law provisions into ordinary legislation also illustrates the problem. FITzPATRIC, supra note 5, at 19.
58. Derogation of 20 August 1971, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 32 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R.); Derogation of 23January 1973, 1973 Eur. Cony. on H.R. 24 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.); Derogation of 16 August 1973, 1973 Eur. Cony. on H.R. 26 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.); Derogation of 18 December 1978, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 22 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.); Derogation of 23 December 1988, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 15
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
59. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
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The issues before the Court were

whether the scale of arrests and the selection of detainees were
within the parameters of Article 15,60 and whether allegations of
mistreatment of those detained would be sustained. 6 1 The Irish
Government, while not disputing the existence of an emergency,
questioned the strict necessity for the detention and interrogation techniques employed by the United Kingdom in the detention centers of Northern Ireland.6" The fundamental issue for
the applicant state was whether some of the techniques employed as regular interrogation practices amounted to the use of
torture under Article 3 of the Convention.6"
Two points should be emphasized. First, neither Court nor
Commission paid significant attention to their obligation to examine whether, in fact, a situation of emergency existed, as opposed to examining whether the specific measures in question
were "strictly required" by the situation. 4 Their approach in this
respect was characterized by passivity and indicated a retreat
from the "right to scrutiny" doctrine of Lawless.65
Second, the examination of the specific measures was characterized by the manipulation of categories as a tool to avoid
specific scrutiny of the net effect of the techniques used. Practi60. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 512, 516, 518 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.) (noting that of initial 350 persons arrested on August 9, 1971, 104
were released within 48 hours); Irelandv. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5.
61. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 604-06 (Eur. Comm'n
H.R.). Techniques of ill-treatment described by detainees were both physical and psychological. Id. They included physical ill-treatment involving enforced posture by detainees on walls during interrogation, holding, noise, deprivation of sleep, and a diet of
bread and water. Id. Other complaints related to pre-questioning physical abuse. See
Ian Brownlie, Interrogationin Depth: The Compton and ParkerReports, 35 MOD. L.REv. 501,
502-03 (1972).
62. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 542 (Eur. Comm'n
H.R.) (report of the Commission). The Commission found that "both parties agree on
the existence of an emergency situation within the meaning of Art. 15 during the period material to the application." Id. at 542-44.
63. Id. at 516-18. Article 3 of the European Convention provides that: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
European Convention, supra note 2, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, Europ. T.S. No. 5, at 3.
64. See P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THE THEORY AND PRAcricE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 552-53 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that preliminary
determination of "public emergency" is essential for determining whether derogations
applied are "strictly required").
65. Hartman, supra note 5, at 33 (emphasizing fact that "Commission in Ireland v.
United Kingdom gave little consideration to proportionality and hardly explored possible
alternatives").
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cally, this meant looking at the effect of each technique employed separately, adducing whether each individually
amounted to the standard of torture. Two results ensued. The
combined effect of utilizing more than one technique on detainees was lost, thus avoiding the conclusion that the end product
for each individual detainee could amount to the level of torture. 66 Further, the legal quibbling on the distinction between
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment can arguably be
said to result in setting a lower standard overall in protecting this
fundamental, non-derogable right.
Another problematic area studiously avoided by the Commission and Court was the issue of discrimination.6 7 As one
commentator cogently argues, "[o ]ne of the most serious flaws
of the Commission's analysis is its failure to tie the fact of discrimination directly to the question of whether the measures
were strictly required."6" Finally, the margin of appreciation
doctrine found a strong advocate in the majority opinion of the
Court. The doctrine moved from the mere recognition of the
state need for discretion, to a statement that the discretion extended to elevating the vantage point of the state as the body in
the "better position" to choose the methods necessary to deal
with exigency.6" The keynote seems to be abdication of scrutiny,
or at best, the power to stamp a state decision with the legitimacy
of the Convention's seal of approval.
D. The ClearEmergence of State Focused Doctrine
Ireland v. United Kingdom started the trend on the retreat
66. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5. In its final decision,
the Court did not take into account the argument made by the Irish Government that
the detention procedure was not provided with sufficient safeguards or review procedures to prevent abuse. Id. This presents a further retreat from the Court's approach in
both the Lawless and Klass cases. See Lawess, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 27; Klass v.
Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1978) [hereinafter Klass]. In Lawless and Klass,
the bench suggested that parliamentary control should generally be substituted to
guard against the abuse of special executive powers. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
27; Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-28.
67.

KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CON-

TROL OF POLrrICAL VIOLENCE (1980). Despite extensive civil disorder in the Protestant
community following the introduction of the army into Northern Ireland in 1969, no
detention orders were issued against Protestants; civil disobedience in the Protestant
community was left entirely to the ordinary criminal process to contain. Id.

68. See Hartman,, supra note 5, at 34.
69. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 79.
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from scrutiny. The Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom judgment and the recent Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom
decision follow the same pattern.7 0 Both of these cases concerned the alleged violation of Article 5, which protects due process rights under the Convention.
The Court in Brogan, while concluding that a breach of the
Convention had occurred, posited the opinion that such a
breach could be contextualized in relation to the ongoing terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. 71 The case concerned the
arrest and detention of four applicants under Section 12 of the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984.72 All
were held in detention centers for periods ranging from four to
six days. 73 All were subsequently released without criminal
charge.
Though the Court specifically recognized that the United
Kingdom Government had withdrawn its notice of derogation to
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, and thus derogation could not be considered as relevant, some aspects of the
Court's approach are problematic.7 ' Despite the strong finding
that there was a breach of Article 5(3)75 with respect to all four
70. Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16; Brannigan and McBride v. United
Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1993) [hereinafter Branniganand McBride].
71. Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27.
72. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, 48 Halsbury Stat.

972 (3d ed., 1978) (Eng.).
73. Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-21. Terence Patrick Brogan was held

for a period of detention of five days and eleven hours; Dermot Coyle was held for six
days and sixteen and a half hours; William McFadden was held in custody for four days
and six hours; Michael Tracey's period ofdetention was four days and six hours. Id. All

four applicants were informed by their arresting officer that they were being arrested
under Section 12 of the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act. Id. at 21. On the day following their arrests, each applicant was informed by police officers that the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland had agreed to extend their detention for a further five days

under Section 12(4) of the 1984 Act. Id None of the applicants were brought before a
judge or other judicial power. Id.; see Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, 48 Halsbury
Stat. 972,
12 (3d ed, 1978) (Eng.).
74. Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28. The United Kingdom Government
informed the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe on August 22, 1984 that the

Article 15 derogation was being withdrawn. See Stephen Livingstone, A Week is a Long
Time in Detention: Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 40 N.I.L.Q. 288, 291 (1989).

75. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 4.
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercisejudicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
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applicants, contextualization of the findings gives sight to the
Court's view of where the balance between institutional interest
in maintaining democratic structures and the protection of individual rights should be struck. This is a prime example of the
Court finding that a democratic government is making a good
faith effort to preserve human rights, and defacto giving the state
a wider margin of appreciation than those states with a lesser
reputation for rights enforcement.76 Setting the balance of discretion in favor of democratic states is directly aided by the use
of context justification. The context is the subjective assessment
of a terrorist or other political threat, imported into the core of
the judicial argument that becomes the base-line from which
legal justifications follow.7 7 The sub-text of this justification is an
unwillingness to impute to democratic states the negation that
regularly occurs in respect to rights, in situations where the government perceives threats to the democratic structure or to public order.
The inverse effect of this pro-state balance is seen in Brogan
with respect to the majority opinion's approach to the alleged
breach of Article 5 (1) .78 Standing outside the framework of dera reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial.
Id.
76. Mangan, supra note 55, at 383; Castberg, supra note 55, at 169.
77. Branniganand McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31. The opening sequence
to the Brannigan judgment, under the heading "Relevant Domestic Law and Practice,"
is a six paragraph expose of the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. Id. at 38. Thus,
the tone is set from the outset. Any consideration of the proportionality of measures
employed by the state is subsequent to the pre-accepted context.
78. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 3-4. Article 5(1) stipulates:
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure proscribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority;
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ogation, consensually removed by the respondent Government,
the Court was not undertaking an innovative nor inspirational
approach.79 Rather, the Court was left to follow its own logic, as
set in previous cases, with respect of the breach of Article 5(3).
The applicants argued that their arrest failed to comply with
Article 5(1) (c) of the Convention on the grounds that they were
not arrested on suspicion of responsibility for a specific offense.8 0 Empirical and testimonial evidence before the Court
demonstrated strongly that arrests under Section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act served information-gathering and
counter-insurgency purposes for the state.8 1 The Court again
demonstrated its reluctance to critically address the Government's assessment of fact. 2 In this case, its avoidance mechanism was to move from a discussion of the concrete to a discussion of the abstract. The abstract discussion was grounded in a
discussion of the validity of results. The Court stated that outcome per se did not determine the legitimacy of the arrest procedure.8" The Court's inability to respond to the general trend
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or
vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
Id.
79. See deJong Bajet, and van den Brink, 77 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 21-22. It should
also be noted that the Court's finding on Article 5(3) follows logically from the precedent set by the Court in a number of previous applications. X v. The Netherlands, 1966
Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 564, 568 (finding that "Contracting parties are given a certain
margin of appreciation when interpreting and applying the requirement as to promptitude laid down in Article 5, paragraph (3)"); X v. Belgium, App. No. 7960/71, 42 COtLECTION OF DECISIONS 54, 55 (1973).
80. Brogan, 145B Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 28.
[T]he applicants maintained that their arrest and detention were grounded
on suspicion, not of having committed a specific offence, but rather of involvement in unspecified acts of terrorism, something which did not constitute a
breach of the criminal law in Northern Ireland and could not be regarded as
an 'offence' under Article 5(1) (c).
Id.
81. Se DERMOT WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTH-

ERN IRELAND 33-34 (1983).
82. Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30.
83. See id. The Court firmly stated:
The court is not required to examine the impugned legislation in abstracto,
but must confine itself to the circumstances of the case before it. The fact that
the applicants were neither charged nor brought before a court does not
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that arrest cases under Section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism
Act manifested in the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, allow the
state to avoid scrutiny of the entire detention process.84
Given that derogation was not an issue, and that the claim
had been withdrawn by the United Kingdom Government four
years previously, the mentioning of derogation, despite its subsequent exclusion, gives sight of the Court positioning its potential
permissibility.8 5 The judgment contains pervasive references to
the ongoing terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland.8 6 The majority states that despite excluding the examination of derogation, account may be taken of other material and concurrent issues, "[t]his does not, however, preclude proper account being
taken of the background circumstances of the case."87
This statement opens the door to the consideration and judicial use of a plethora of context justifications as a means to
circumvent the strict applicability of state responsibility for the
enforcement of basic rights. Article 5 of the Convention is subject to well-defined limitation clauses.8 8 The inclusion of context
justification is an additional "clawback" on Article 5, brought in
through the judicial side-door. Despite the positive finding for
mean necessarily mean that the purpose of their detention was not in accordance with Article 5(1)(c).
Id.
84. Id. (citing cases where criticism does not apply to dissenting opinion ofJudges
Walsh and Carrillo Salcedo with respect to Article 5(1)).
85. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The Court majority opinion states at paragraph
48, "[clonsequently, there is no call in the present proceedings to consider whether any
derogation from the United Kingdom's obligations might be permissible under Article
15 by reason of a terroristcampaign in Northern Ireland." Id. The Court itself is thus invoking the potential justification on behalf of the government. Id.
86. Id. at 21-24, 27, 83.
87. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
88. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, at 4. Article 5 (3) reads: ,
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear to trial.,
Id. The limitation clauses of Article 5 include that no person shall be deprived of their
liberty save in six enumerated exceptions, and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Id. art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 227, Europ. T.S. No. 5, at 3; see Alexandre
Charles Kiss, PermissibleLimitation on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BiLL OF RIGHTS 290
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (examining permissible limitations on human rights as distinguished from "derogation from rights in time of public emergency").
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the applicants in Brogan, the glimmer of alternative limitation in
the guise of contextualizing is a step backwards for rights en89
forcement.
Following the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Brogan, on November 29 1988, the United Kingdom
Government, on December 22 1988, issued a further notice of
derogation in respect of Article 5(3). 9 ' There is a cogent argument that the derogation was issued as a direct response to the
judgment rather than to any upsurge in violence or increased
threat to the security of the state. 9 1
E. Entrenching the Non-Interference Principle
Brannigan and McBride, the case which followed Brogan, reflects a clear failure to examine the possibility that the derogation was simply a response to an adverse Court decision by the
state. 92 The case is a clear manifestation of the conservative
agenda being followed by the Court in respect to emergency situations. The applicants raise a number of issues concerning the
89. See Brogan, 145B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30. The Court decided that there had
been a breach of Article 5(3) in all four cases. Id. at 34. The majority found that,
"[t]he Court thus has to conclude that none of the applicants was either brought
Ipromptly' before ajudicial authority or released 'promptly' following his arrest." Id.
The alleged breach of Article 5(4) was rejected. Id. at 35. A breach of Article 5(5) was
sustained. Id. at 35. An alleged breach of Article 13 (effective remedy) was rejected.
Id. at 36.
90. Amicus Brief for Liberty, Interights and the Committee on the Administration
ofJustice at 28, Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49.
91. Id. Note the statement of Douglas Hogg, at the time Under-Secretary of State
for the Home Department to the House of Commons on December 13, 1988:
The case of Brogan and Others has rightly exercised Hon. Members' minds.
The Committee will recall that my Right Hon. Friend the Home Secretary told
the House on 6 December that we shall bring forward our proposals for responding to the judgement in the Brogan case as soon as possible and before
the Bill leaves the House. The matter is complex, and whether we opt for
derogation or some sort ofjudicial control, the implications are obviously farreaching.
Id.
92. Branniganand McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37. Peter Brannigan was
arrested and detained under Section 12 (1)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 ("PTA"). Id. He was detained for six days, fourteen hours
and thirty minutes. Id. His co-applicant Peter McBride was also arrested under Section
12(1) (b) of the PTA. Id. He was detained for four days, six hours and twenty-five minutes. Id. Both were released without charge. Id. (indicating that each defendant was
released after their detention periods). Neither were brought before ajudicial authority during the course of their detention. Id.
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93
validity of the derogation entered by the United Kingdom.
They contend that the derogation was merely the mechanic response taken by the state party to the adverse finding of the Brogan decision.9 4 It can be argued that the validity of the emergency was not based on the magnitude of the terrorist threat, but
served as a means for the government to avoid reforming detention practices which serve a strong counter-insurgency function
in gathering information. The Court and the Commission maintain that while the judgment "triggered off"9 5 the derogation,
there was no reason to indicate that the derogation was anything
other than a "genuine response. "96
The unwillingness of the Court to examine why, prior to the
Broganjudgment,the state could function adequately without resort to derogation is a clear manifestation of an unwarranted
non-interference principle. 97 Amicus briefs to the Court stressed
that there was empirical evidence to dispute that a truly exceptional situation existed justifying a continued state of emergency.9" The case illustrates the danger of the burden of proof
shifting silently in favor of the state in a manner inappropriate to
achieving the ends envisioned by the Convention's drafters. The
burden must firmly lie with the state to demonstrate why the recourse to emergency provisions is required. It must not lie solely
upon those opposed to the derogation provision to prove its unreasonableness or lack of proportionate response.
The state of emergency has been normalized and criminalized as a means of depolitization in Northern Ireland. Thus,

93. Id. at 48-50.
94. Id. at 51.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Amicus Brief for Liberty, Interights and the Committee on the Administration
ofJustice at 49, Branniganand McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49. Note the final
paragraph of the United Kingdom Governments' Note Verbale to the Secretary-General of August 22, 1984:
The United Kingdom Government, taking account of developments in the
situation over the period covered by the notices [of derogation] referred to
above and in the measures taken to deal with it, have come to the conclusion
that it is no longer necessary, in order to comply with its obligations to continue, at the present time, to avail itself of the right of derogation under Article 15 ....
Id.
98. Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36. Amnesty International, Liberty, Interights, and the Northern Ireland based Committee on the Administration ofJustice filed amicus briefs. Id.
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there is a need to examine the incompatibility of declaring an
emergency externally to satisfy the procedural requirements of
treaty obligations, and operating internally in judicial and executive disavowal of a state of exigency. In such a situation the derogating state can have the best of both worlds. Internal political
strife is managed by extraordinary means, allowing greater effectiveness with fewer constraints. External obligations are satisfied
with cursory monitoring and international legitimization of the
approach taken.
The Brannigan and McBidejudgment serves to illustrate the
particularly problematic approach taken by the Court and Commission in confronting permanent emergencies. The International Law Association 99 and other commentators have stressed
that one of the "four basic elements" of an emergency is its provisional and temporary character. 100 The applicants, Brannigan
and McBride, stressed that in situations of permanent emergency it was inconsistent for the national authorities to be afforded a wide margin of appreciation. The Court side-stepped
the issues of addressing both the status of permanent emergencies and the appropriate measure of latitude to be granted to
states in respect of them.
By regarding each derogation case as an exception, the
Court ignores the fact that the same respondent government
may be appearing frequently before the bench with respect to
the same situation of exigency. By refusing to regard the history
or frequency of previous derogation as being relevant to the arbitration of the particular derogation before the Court, the issue
is never addressed. A quasi-permanent, quasi-emergency must
be viewed as a direct contradiction to the purposes of Article
15.101 The Court indirectly addresses the issue by making refer-

ence to the language of permanent emergencies, in stating that
it takes judicial note that the applicants and others call for
99. The International Law Association, at its 61st conference, held in Paris from
August 26 to September 1, 1984, approved by consensus a set of minimum standards
governing the declaration and administration of states of emergency that threaten the
life of a nation. The standards were the culmination of six years of study by a subcommittee of the Association, and two additional years of revision by the full Committee on
the Enforcement of Human Rights Law.
100. See, CHOWDHURY, supra note 5, at 24-29.
101. See supra note 21 (explaining why quasi-emergency is contrary to purpose of
Article 15).
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tighter standards of accountability in respect of them.1 °2 That is,
however, as far as the Court goes. The objections are noted, but
not examined, nor is the paradox of their co-existence with the
legal aims of Article 15 examined.
On the question of whether permanent or quasi-emergency
situations require greater scrutiny, the Court employed semantic
Arguably, if a
tactics to avoid directly addressing the issue.'
state is to be allowed a margin of appreciation, at all, it should
become narrower the more permanent the alleged emergency
becomes. The Court refused to examine the issue of proportionality. Instead it took refuge in the safe re-statement of the
classic margin of appreciation formula. The majority agreed
that:
The Court recalls that it falls to each Contracting State, with
its responsibility for "the life of (its) nation", to determine
whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and,
if so, how far it 0is4 necessary to go in attempting to overcome
the emergency.'
Following this restatement a further step was taken. Not
only was the Court unwilling to narrow the margin of appreciation given to the state, it actually sought to expand the margin's
scope. Building on the foundation of the Ireland v. UK case,'0°
the Court pressed that, "a wide 'margin of appreciation' should
be left to the national authorities." 106
The Court in Brannigan and McBride paid no heed to the
numerous derogations entered by the British Government in relation to the suspension of certain rights in Northern Ireland
102. Branniganand McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49. Note in particular the
use of language and semantic tactics to not directly address the permanent emergency
conundrum. Id. at 49. Liberty, Interrights, and the Committee on the Administration
ofJustice (Liberty and others) submitted for their part that, if States are to be allowed a
margin of appreciation at all, it should be narrower the more permanent the emergency becomes. Id.
103. Id. at 49. The Court heard the applicants argue that a wide margin of appreciation should not be afforded to the state where the "emergency was of a quasi-perma-

nent nature." Id. The Court recounted amicus briefs that argued that the margin of
appreciation should become "narrower the more permanent the emergency becomes."
Id. In drawing its conclusions, the Court failed to mention either permanent emergencies or whether the level of scrutiny by the Court ought to be higher in such cases. Id.
at 49-50.
104. Id. at 49.
105. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 79.
106. Id.
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and the potential relationship between them and its validation of
the emergency. The Court paid scant attention to the permanent state of emergency in the jurisdiction, which has existed
since its inception in 1922. The concept of an emergency is not
a perpetual state of affairs, it is both temporal and limited. 10 7
When the short-term becomes permanent, international courts
examining the application of such provisions should be required
to ask whether an emergency is the appropriate standard to apply. The erosion of the Court's interest in asking the question
demonstrates its shift in emphasis. As the protection of the
state's interest assumes a paramount status, the claims of the individual are diminished. The vestige of accountability exists in
the Court hearing and the process of adjudication. The result is
meaningless because the adjudication is merely a process of validation for the state and diminished worth for the individual.
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM EXAMINED
Although burdened with a shorter history, the approach of
the Inter-American Court has been markedly different than that
of the European Court. 10 8 In a small number of decisions, the
Inter-American Court has been forthright in its examination of
governmental practices in relation to emergency situations. 109
107. See JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11-33 (1992) (discussing definition of emergency by examining its meaning in
three primary multilateral treaties).
108. American Convention, supra note 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 9 I.L.M. at 673.
The Convention, adopted in 1969, provides for two significant procedural bodies to
safeguard the implementation of the rights contained in the Convention. Chapter VII
of the Convention outlines the structure of the Commission, while the role and composition of the Court is outlined in Chapter VIII. The Inter-American Court was formally
instituted in 1979, and consists of seven judges elected by State Parties to the Convention. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 52, 53, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 16, 9 I.L.M.
at 673. Only State Parties or the Commission may refer cases to the Court. In addition
to its responsibility to hear cases, the Court functions in an advisory capacity to the
Member States of the O.A.S. Its advisory function is extensive and is not limited solely
to the interpretation of the American Convention. See Thomas Buergeanthal, The InterAmerican System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 439, 460-70 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984) (outlining pow-

ers and jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights by virtue of American
Convention); see Dinah L. Shelton, The Inter-American System for the Protedion of Human
Rights: Emergent Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw THEORY AND PRACTICE 369
(Irwin Coder & F. Pearl Eliadis eds., 1992).
109. American Convention, supra note 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 16, 9 I.L.M. at 673.
Derogation under the American Convention is governed by Article 27, which provides:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the indepen-
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Because of the historical background of many states in the region and the persistent resort to the emergency concept to justify state negation of rights, the Court has steadfastly stated that
the state of emergency is a limited concept to be critically examined.
The Court has stressed that an emergency is a finite concept
subject to close examination. 1 0 In its advisory opinion on
habeas corpus in states of emergency, the transitory nature of
the emergency constitution is highlighted."' The case dealt
with potential limitations to the right of habeas corpus in times
of crisis."' The Court argued that to deprive a detainee of the
right to be brought before ajudicial authority to prolong detention indefinitely would be "equivalent to attributing uniquely judicial functions to the executive branch."" 3 The Court, in language resonant of the approach of its European counterpart, argued that the limitation imposed by exigency be strictly limited
and a proportionate response to the crisis faced.1 4 It uniquely
pointed out that abuses can result from the "application of emergency measures not objectively justified in the light of the requirements prescribed in Article 27."115 Furthermore, while both
Courts use similar language to assess competing claims, there is a
distinction that lies in the outcome of their assessment. The Inter-American Court has taken decisions that back up its strong
rhetoric, while its European counterpart has been less forthcomdence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating, from its
obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of
.time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law and do not discriminate on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origins.
Id.
110. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American
Convention on Human Rights), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40, OEA/ser.L./VI/
111.9, doc. 13 (1987) [hereinafter Judicial Guarantees].
111. Judicial Guarantees,9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40.
112. Id. The Court unanimously held that "'essential' judicial guarantees which
are not subject to derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, include
habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo, and any other effective remedy before judges or
competent tribunals (Art. 25(1))." Id.
113. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), 8 Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (ser. A) at 33, OEA/ser.L./V/
111.17, doc. 13 (1987) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus].
114. Habeus Cops, 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-39.
115. Id.; see supra note 21 (explaining Article 27).
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ing in this respect." 6
In the Judicial Guarantees decision, the Court in its advisory
opinion capacity, examined the extent to which judicial guarantees and remedies could be minimized in a period of emergency
in accordance with Article 27 of the Convention. 1 7 The Court
concluded that some fundamental rights may never be excluded
and that 'judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such
rights" are also immune from limitation.'
The Court held that
9
the due process guarantees of Article 8" of the American Convention cannot be suspended in situations of emergency, insofar
as they are prerequisites for the necessary functioning ofjudicial
guarantees.120
What is unique about this judgement is the multi-layered
approach of the Court. Rights are recognized as being knitted
into one another, interdependent and inseparable. Thus, to
speak of rights protection in situations of emergency is to link
together the rights that guarantee protection rather than to isolate certain non-derogable rights as being sufficient per se to protect the individual against potential excesses by the state in times
of crisis. This is an approach that recognizes that the core and
penumbra of derogable and non-derogable rights are interlinked and mutually significant to one another.
The Court draws directly from the experience of its hemisphere. 2 1 It recognizes that the exercise of emergency powers is
inherently and historically fraught with abuse and leads to the
subversion of the democratic order.' 2 2 The judgment recog116. See, e.g., Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Ireland v United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 5; Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36.
117. Judicial Guarantees,9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24.
118. Id.
119. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 8, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 4, 9 I.L.M. at

676. Article 8 protects the right to fair trial. Its provisions include the right to a hearing by a competent, independent tribunal; the right to be presumed innocent; the right
to notification of pending criminal charges; the right to counsel of choice; the right to
examine witnesses; and the right of appeal to a higher court. Id.
120. Id. at 9.
121. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE SINCE THE Coup: TEN YEARS OF REPRESSION
(1983); AMEaiCAs WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA (1987); LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, URUGUAY.

THE END OF A NIGHTMARE?

(1984); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, THE FAILED PROMISE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE PHILIPPINES SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1986 (1991); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NICARAGUA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD (1986); GeorgeJ. Alexander, The Illusory Protection
of Human Rights by National Courts DuringPeriods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984).
122. Judicial Guarantees,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 98.
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nizes that the nature, and therefore, the appropriate examination of emergencies can vary. The Court states that "what might
be permissible in one type of emergency would not be lawful in
another."' 23 This distinction illustrates the subtlety and depth
needed to judicially address different kinds of crises that are subsumed under the "emergency" label. In contrast, the European
Court approach has been to starkly categorize disparate crises as
"emergency situations,"' 24 and, when validated, to leave the appropriate measure of response to the individual assessment of
the state. The genesis in this judgment is a multi-layered approach by the Inter-American Court, recognizing the differences
in intensity and length of emergency and potentially developing
a tailored complex approach to international judicial intervention.
A. The Scope of Advisory Opinions

Though the number of cases considered by the Court in its
contentious jurisdiction role have been limited, the approach
taken in a number of advisory (non-emergency) opinions illustrates the expansive thinking and the impetus to move further
than its European counterpart. In its advisory opinion for Costa
Rica relating to the compulsory membership of an association
for the purpose of practicing the profession of journalism, the
Court established a number of interesting judicial ap125
proaches.

The case arose from a request by Costa Rica that the Court
consider the compatibility of its domestic legislation regulating
the compulsory licensing ofjournalists with Articles 13 and 29 of
the Convention. 26 The domestic legal provisions required all
123. Id. at 99.
124. Compare Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)
with Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
125. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed By Law for the Practice
ofJournalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), 5 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) [hereinafter Compulsory Membership]. The crux of the Court's
decision was grounded in the refusal to accept a distinction between the freedom of
expression guaranteed in Article 13 and the practice ofjournalism as a means of imparting the information upon which the freedom is based. Compulsory Membership, 5
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 90-91.

126. American Convention, supra 2, arts. 13, 29, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 5,10, 9 I.L.M
at 679, 684. Article 13 outlines the protection for freedom of thought and expression
in the Convention. Article 13(1) provides the "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and
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journalists practicing their profession to be members of a
"colegio" or professional association. The Court examined
whether rights to free expression and association as guaranteed
by the Convention were undermined by the state requirement.
The Court's approach is novel in two respects. First, the
Court interprets restrictively the limitations imposed on the
right to freedom of expression. 2 7 Article 29 of the Convention
outlines the basis upon which rights may be read restrictively
under the Convention. 28 A clear link is made between restrictions and their imposition as necessary to ensure the achievement of a democratic society.' 2 9 Second, the Court explicitly
states that Article 13 of the American Convention was intended
in its format to be more generous than its European counterpart. Implicit also is the judicial assumption that the Inter-American Court's interpretation is equally intended to be wider and
more expansive. 130 The Court states, "[a] comparison ... indicates that the guarantees contained in the American Convention
regarding freedom of expression were designed to be more generous and to reduce to a bare minimum restrictions impeding
the free circulation of ideas."' 31 This keynote is further expanded in the dicta that the Inter-American Court will use cases
decided by the European Court and the Human Rights Committee when their value is to augment rights protection. 32 There is
a firm commitment to the non-incorporation of restrictions
33
from other systems.1
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of his choice." Id. art.
13(1), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 5, 9 I.L.M. at 679.
127. Id. art. 13, OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 5, 9 I.L.M. at 679. Article 13 guarantees the
right of freedom of expression. Id.
128. Id. art. 29, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 10, 9 I.L.M. at 684. Article 29 mandates that:
no provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as:
(a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; ...
(c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human
personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government.
Id.
129. Compulsory Membership, supra note 125, 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 82.
130. Id. at 84.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Court states that "if in the same situation both the American and

19951

THE EMERGENCE OFDIVERSITY

As an aside, the Court is honest in its assessment that limitations such as "public order" and "general welfare" are quickly
manipulated by collective state interests against the individual.' 34
Though this case is not grounded in an emergency context, it is
nonetheless relevant to understanding the views of the Court on
the appropriate ambit of limitations on the exercise of rights.
Analysis of the case law on limitations is a means of understanding the comparative distinctions in emergency doctrine emerging from international courts.
B. The Inter-American Court's Distinctive Regional Response
The views expressed by the Inter-American Court on limitations are a solid indicator of its response to restrictions generally.
The core manifestation of emergency lies in the restrictions
placed on the exercise of rights. When emergency measures are
at issue judicially, they arise by virtue of a dispute over the appropriate exercise of limitations or the justification for limitation per
se. A symbiotic relationship exists between Court approaches to
limitation clauses, generally, and an institutional understanding
of the emergency exception. 135 In examining limitations on
rights generally, the Inter-American Court has flexed some judicial muscle in remaining strongly protective of the widest interpretation of rights protection even where strong policy reasons
are advocated by the state as the reason for the imposition of
restrictions. It posits well for the Court's potential dealing with
situations of exception.
Equally, it should be pointed out that the Inter-American
Commission,1 3 6 as a body of the O.A.S. Charter, has functioned
reasonably well in its dealings with situations of gross and systematic violations of rights occurring in the territory of Member
States. 13 7 Country visits and on-site investigations have been paranother international treaty are applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual
must prevail." Id.
134. Id. at 88.
135. See Clovis Morrison, Margin of Appreciation in Human Rights Law, 4 HUM. RTs.
L.J. 263 (1971). A number of commentators have demonstrated how the margin of
appreciation, initially employed in respect of the interpretation of Article 15 derogation
by states, has been stretched and used in other contexts. Id.; see also Feingold, supra
note 49; O'Donnell, supra note 38.
136. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing Inter-American Court
and American Convention).
137. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, OEA/ser.L./V/
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ticularly successful in this respect, arguably to the detriment of
the individual complaint system. Notwithstanding the latter, the
Inter-American system demonstrates some historical and political tenacity in addressing large-scale situations of crisis. Such
background creates hope for the political context in which the
Inter-American Court will address exigency situations in the region.
Faced with diverse issues ranging from limits on journalistic
freedom, writs of habeas corpus, right to life, and due process
concerns related to disappearances, the Court has maintained
that limitations on rights are to be balanced with safeguards.
The philosophy underlying the Convention is that rights are to
be guaranteed not suspended.1 38 The Court has emphasized its
autonomy in stating that governments are stepping outside the
bounds prescribed by the instrument that binds them in overlimiting individual rights. In its willingness to hold states accountable at crisis moments, when governments are prone to
state that strict accountability hinders the political process, the
Court has demonstrated both its integrity and its strength.
The variance of approach by the European Court and Commission reflects diverse elements. The difference demonstrates
the symbiotic relationship that the judicial branch has with the
Council of Europe and the political networks that underpin the
Convention. Situations of emergency are particularly reflective
of this. Threats to the democratic order, and institutional responses to them, not only affect the country coping with a crisis,
but have consequences for other onlookers. Each state is aware
that its own sovereignty and leverage to respond to political disorder can potentially be limited by external scrutiny. Doubtless,
11.46, doc 23 rev.1 (1978). It is important to note that the O.AS. was focused on the
issue of emergency from an early point. When the drafters of the Convention began
work in the 1960's they had the benefit of a significant study on states of emergency.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 5, at 55 (discussing O.A.S. study on states of emergency).
138. Compulsory Membership, 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1988). The Court remains committed to preserving
the integrity of its institutional structure. See In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al.,
No. G 101/81, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 73 (1984). The Government of Costa Rica
sought to waive procedural requirements, and bring an alleged violation of Articles 4
and 5 directly before the Court. The Court resisted such a move, notwithstanding a
recognition of the State's competence to waive these requirements. It upheld its right
to protect not only the institutional integrity of the system but further the rights of the
individual within the structure. Viviana GaUardo,No. G 101/81, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 87.
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judges sitting on these cases are not unaware of potential sideeffects in limiting state actions in response to political crises in
their own states. The political sub-culture of the European states
is an intrinsic part of the unstated response by the Court to the
derogation cases.13 9 While a political dynamic is equally apparent in the Inter-American model, the judicial branch has been
further prepared to confront states in the areas of systematic and
ongoing violations. Possible reasons for the difference include
the historical and political forces that have shaped the American
hemisphere and a nuanced understanding of the harmful potential of ongoing emergencies. A second possible reading is that
the Inter-American Court system is still a fledgling, and that history will shape a path for its judicial outlook which, as yet, remains undefined.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE CONSIDERED
The history of the Human Rights Committee tells another
story. From the outset it should be understood that the Committee has not been a paradigm of virtue in respect to its management of situations of exception.1 40 In some respects, however, its
approach to exigency in a number of individual complaint decisions, where Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has been employed by states as a defense to the
abridgement of rights, has demonstrated the will to confront inappropriate state action. Further, the generally constrained role
of the Committee must be contextualized in relation to a less
expansive complaints procedure and the complex political un139. Mangan, supra note 55, at 382. Mangan identifies politics, in its widest sense,
as a primary shortcoming in the effectiveness of the European system. Id. at 382-83.
The Court's concern in maintaining its legitimacy in the eyes of the State Parties is
sharply evident in the derogation cases. Id. Where national interests are at stake, the
danger exists that the state might refuse to recognize the compulsoryjurisdiction of the
Court, enter reservations, or withdraw from the Convention. Id.
140. See The Individual'sDuties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights
and Freedoms Under Artice 29 of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, U.N. Sub. Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc E/
CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev. 2 (1983); JOAN FITZGERALD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN Custs 82-114
(1994). Chowdhury argues that the deficiencies of the Committee are related to three
specific problems. CHOWDHURY, supra note 5, at 82. First, the lack of consensus within
the United Nations community as to the function of controls over member states. Id.
Second, the lack of independence and impartiality evidenced by members of the Committee. Id. Third, the time constraints on the meeting of the Committee further hindered by lack of infrastructural facilities and resources. Id.
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derpinning of the United Nations structure. 141 The political
backdrop of the United Nations has little of the cultural, historical, or social common networks that characterize the European
system. It is the commonality and consensus in the European
context which creates the expectation that the European Convention is in a better position to provide stronger and more cogent standards for the regulation of emergency situations.
The Committee's creation had a long and tortured history.
Its existence was first approved in 1950, after a protracted debate
within the Human Rights Commission. It was given the task of
drafting the International Bill of Rights by the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC).142 The adoption of an Optional Pro-,
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
guaranteed the right of individual petition to the Committee.'4
As with the Inter-American Court, the Committee has considered the resort to emergency measures and subsequent derogation from international human rights obligations in few individual cases.1 44 This fact is linked to the limited number of state
parties that signed the Optional Protocol, limited financial re141. CHOWDHURY, supra note 5, at 131.
142. See DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HumAN RIGHTS COMMirrEE (1991) (discussing
various sessions of Human Rights Committee). It was during its sixth session that the
Human Rights Commission gave structural impetus to the notion of implementation.
The permanent implementation body created was the Human Rights Committee. Initially, the Committee was approved only to consider inter-state complaints, as opposed
to complaints filed by individuals or non-governmental organizations. It was at the
ninth session, in 1953, that the Human Rights Commission adopted additional articles
concerning the precise make-up of the Human Rights Committee. The General Assembly reviewed the draft Covenants in 1954. Thereafter began a decade of scrutiny. This
was primarily undertaken by the Third Committee of the Assembly. Three fundamental additions were proposed and accepted by the Third Committee. Primary of these
was the optional provision for the scrutiny of individual complaints. This was ultimately
instated as an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Finally, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 2200 (XI) and on December 16, 1966 opened for signature both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
143. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).
144. American Convention, supra note 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673. The
reporting system of states under Article 40 of the Covenant remains the primary monitoring mechanism of derogation. This is because of the limited number of states who
are parties to the Optional Protocol and the smaller number who have accepted the
competence of the Committee to adjudicate interstate complaints. CHOWDHURY, supra
note 5, at 74-75. Prior to 1992, the Human Rights Committee received 514 registered
cases of which 138 were concluded amicably, 49 were declared admissible, and 92 were
pending in the pre-admissibility stage. See Rein Mullerson, The Efficiency of the Individual
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sources for applicants, and a myriad of other procedural obstacles.' 4 5 The fact of emergency has been frequent in the country
reports made by states in their reporting duties under Article 40
of the Convention.146 The Committee has used the report review sessions as a means of creating and encouraging dialogue
with the state parties about the status, validity, and measures
taken with respect to emergencies. 147 The success of state review
under Article 4 is highly dependent on the rapport and candor
of dialogue with the defaulting state. If such dialogue is constrained, the information gleaned may be limited. Despite suffering from certain drawbacks, the Article 40 review process offers a means to engage in an ongoing relationship with the state
about the use of emergency powers. Further, in a general comment concerning derogation under Article 4, the Committee
emphasized its particular concerns about problems of notifica-

Complaint Procedures: The Experience of the CCPR CERD, CAT and ECHR, in MONITORING
31 (Bloed ed., 1993).
145. See McGOLDRICK, supra note 142. The status of the Human Rights Committee
decisions after consideration of communications on their merits is a significant problem. Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol states only that the Committee "shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual." Optional Protocol,
supra note 143, art. 5(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 5. The legal
status of the decision is not mentioned nor is any follow-up to the communication envisaged. The Committee appointed a Special Rapporteur to seek and evaluate information concerning state compliance with adopted Committee views. See Report of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/47/
40 (1992). Chronic underfunding, however, seriously impairs Committee activities.
FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 84. "This underfunding affects its ability to promote implementation of Article 4, along with the rest of the Covenant." Id.,
146. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.17 (1977)
(discussing report filed by United Kingdom under Article 40 of Covenant); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.25 (1978) (discussing report
filed by Chile Under Article 40 of Covenant); Summary Record of the 221st Meeting, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/SR.221 (1980) (discussing
report filed by Columbia under Article 40 of Covenant); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 58, U.N. Doc A/37/40 (1982) (discussing report filed by Uruguay under Article 40 of Covenant). The 1979 Report of the
Human Rights Committee in respect of Chile confirmed that the Committee could take
into consideration, in evaluating derogation and emergency, the information available
from other U.N. organs, such as the Ad Hoc Working Group of the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights.
147. CHOWDHURY, supra note 5, at 83; seeJaap A. Walkate, The Human Rights ComHUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE

mittee and Public Emergncies, 9 YALE J.

WORLD PUB.

ORD. 134 (1982).
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tion and proclamation with respect to exigency. 14 8 The Committee confirmed that notification is not simply a technical and dispensable formality of derogation, but absolutely necessary as a
means to ensure international supervision.' 4 9 The Committee
has also continued to express its concern in this reporting forum
over the resort to derogation, particularly where procedural obligations to the Conventions have not been adhered to.' 50
A. The Singularity of the Committee's Approach to Situations
of Exigency
The Human Rights Committee has demonstrated its willingness to confront state overreaction to perceived internal threats,
allegedly undermining public order and security."' The Com148. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Annex VII, at 110, U.N. Doc A/36/40 (1981).
149. Id. The Committee stated that each derogating state must "fulfill their reporting obligations under article 40 of the Covenant by indicating the nature and extent of each right derogated from together with the relevant documentation." Id.
150. See, e.g., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, 50th Sess., 1316th mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.33 (1994). A good example of this is the recent country report by Cameroon to the Human Rights Committee. Id. at 1 (citing Considerationof Reports Submitted by States PartiesUnder Article 40 of the
Covenant, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc CCPR/C/63/Add.1 (1993)). The Committee strongly
stated its regret that the State's proclamation of a state of emergency in the Nord-Ouest
province, in 1992, was not in accordance with the requirements of Article 4 of the
Covenant. Id. at 2. With regard to Countries' reporting procedures, the Committee
examined the failure of states to adequately confirm the derogation from rights. See,
e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 66,
U.N. Doc. A/35/40 (1980) (discussing Suriname's failure to report derogation from
rights); Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 145, at 298-335 (discussing
Iran's failure to report derogation from rights); Summary Record of the 442nd Meeting,
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.442 (1983) (discussing Lebanon's failure to report derogation from rights); Summary Record of the 443rd
Meeting, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.443 (1983)
(continuing to discuss Lebanon's failure to report derogation from rights).
151. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Annex XV, at 168, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (Consuelo Salgar de Montejo v. Columbia, Communication No. R.15/64) [hereinafter de Montejo];JorgeLandinelli Silva et al.
v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HOMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OTIONAL PROTOCOL 65-66 (1985)
[hereinafter
Landinellil; Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra, Annex XVIII, at 187 (Carmen
Amendola Massiotti v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.6/25); Report of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XXII, at 216, U.N. Doc.
A/38/40 (1983) (Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex IX, at 179, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985) (Monja Jaona v. Madagascar,
Communication No. 132/1982).
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mittee confirmed in the Landinelli decision its competence to
make an independent determination of whether a specific derogation measure is "strictly required.""' The views expressed in
the Camargo de Guerro decision are also indicative of a bright line
drawn at a point where individual protection is the maxim
sought and state justifications for limitations are subject to firm
53
scrutiny.1
The de Guerro case concerned the killing by Colombian police of seven individuals suspected of involvement in the kidnapping of a former Colombian diplomat."' On April 13, 1978, the
judge of the 77th Military Criminal Court of Investigation, himself a member of the police, ordered a raid to be carried out on
a house in the "Contador" district of Bogota in Columbia. 5
The raid was ordered in the belief that the former Columbian
Ambassador was being held there. In spite of finding the house
unoccupied, the police decided to await the arrival of the "suspected kidnappers."156 The police initially suggested that the
victims were killed in the course of resisting arrest. 57 Thejustification for the use of lethal force was proved spurious after forensic examinations revealed no weapons, other than those in police possession, were fired."5 The author of the communication
alleged that the passing of a domestic legislative decree' 5 9 created police immunity to criminal charges with respect to certain
152. Landinelli, supra note 151, at 65-66; see O'Donnell, Commentary by the Rapporteur on Derogation, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 23 (1985). The Committee decided that a fifteen
year ban on political activity had not been justified as necessary to "deal with the alleged
emergency situation and pave the way back to political freedom." Landinelli, supra note
151, at 65-66.
153. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Annex XI, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (Carmargo de Guerro v. Colombia, Communication No, R.11/45) [hereinafter de Guerr0].
154. Id. at 137-38.
155. Id.
156. Id,
157. Id.
158. Id. at 137. The Committee found that:
[T]he report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (Report No. 8683, of 17
April 1978), together with the ballistics reports and the results of the paraffin
test, showed that none of the victims had fired a shot and that they all had
been killed at point-blank range, some of them shot in the back or in the
head.
Id.
159. Id. at 137, 148 (discussing and presenting Colombian Legislative Decree No.
0070 of 1978).
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forms of action, relating to the assessment that the national territory was under threat of siege. 160 The applicant further argued
that the decree was in violation of Articles 6, 7, 9, 14, and 17 of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6 '
The Committee accepted that the Colombian Government
had complied with the formal requirements of notice for derogation in respect of domestic legislative changes to confront the
situation of disturbed public order in the jurisdiction.1 6 It went
on to observe that there were certain provisions of the Covenant
1 63
that can not be derogated from under any circumstances.
The Committee unequivocally concluded that there had been a
violation of the right to life protected under Article 6(1). As a
matter of law the consensus of the Committee was that: "Inasmuch as the police action was made justifiable as a matter of
Colombian law by Legislative Decree No. 0070 of 20 January
1978, the right to life was not adequately protected by the law of
Colombia as required by Article 6(1). "164
Thejudgment contains scant discussion of the mechanics of
derogation and the weighing of state interest against individual
protection. Nonetheless, we can adduce from the strong right to
protection of life statement, a commitment to rights protection,
irrespective of subjective state analysis of appropriate action in
situations of crisis. This decision affirms that the Committee
views the non-derogability of certain fundamental rights as selfevident in the context of derogation. The thrust of the decision
is that the preeminence and status of the right to life undercuts
a judicial balancing approach that would potentially undermine
that right.
The Montejo case, also concerning the Colombian Government's recourse to a state of siege, contains a more detailed
commentary by the Committee on the procedural and proportionate aspects of derogation. 165 The case concerns the imprisonment of the applicant, a newspaper director, by a military tribunal for the alleged offense of illegally selling a weapon con160.
161.
U.N.T.S.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 141.
Id.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, 999
171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6.
de Guerro, supra note 153, at 146.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.

165. de Montejo, supra note 151.
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trary to the domestic Statute of Security. 16 6 The Director was
sentenced to one year of imprisonment and through the sole
recourse procedure available, the recurso de reposicion, the same
judge confirmed her sentence. 167 The Security Statute expressly
prohibited review of conviction by a higher tribunal.1 6 The applicant contended violation of Article 14(5) of the Covenant, in
the denial of right of appeal and violation of Article 14 (1), alleging that the military tribunals were not independent or impar16 9
tial.
The Committee recognized that the Government's communications consistently alluded to a state of siege, and contained
express reference to the application of Article 19, paragraph 2,
and Article 21 of the Covenant. 170 The Committee was not prepared to countenance that Article 14(5) of the Convention was
derogated from in accordance with Article 4.171 By refusing to
accept that derogation is a general provision creating leeway for
any state action in a state of emergency, the Committee was confirming the limited nature of derogation provisions. It stated:
"the Committee is of the view that the State party, by merely invoking the existence of a state of siege, cannot evade the obligations which it invokes by ratifying the Covenant.' 7 2 This case
confirms that the Committee takes a strict view that notice of
derogation cannot be extended to justify limitations or violations
of additional unnotified provisions.
The Committee confirmed that while the right of the state
to take derogating measures might not depend on formal notification, the state party was duty bound, when invoking Article
4(1) of the Covenant in proceedings under the Optional Protocol, to satisfy a neutral finding that the situation alleged in fact
existed. 173 This case confirms that the burden lies on the derogating state to justify its actions.

166. Id. at 168.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

172.
169.
172-73.
173.
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B. The Human Rights Committee Compared
Finally, despite its attenuated powers, the Committee has refused to recognize the legitimacy of curbs on the exercise of
rights by states in emergency situations. It has stated that absent
"submission of fact or law to justify such derogation," 174 the seal
of international approval will not be forthcoming for state action.175 The Landinelli decision confirms that state parties cannot evade responsibility for rights enforcement by "merely invoking the existence of exceptional circumstances," without supplying sufficient information to confirm the necessity of emergency
1 76
measures.
The language and structure of Human Rights Committee
decisions differ substantially from their European and American
counterparts. The detail, length, and often used dissent process
for European judges gives an apparent vestige of more substantial legal analysis and deeper scrutiny. This looking-glass can be
misleading. In substance, the European process reveals a sophisticated procedural mechanism which hides many substantive
flaws. Equally, the function of the Human Rights Committee, in
terms of individual applications under the Optional Protocol,
cannot be disassociated from the country report mechanism that
has consistently had to pronounce on the resort to states of
emergency.1 77 Such discussion points to the wide confrontation
which the Committee has sought, in respect of state obligations
regarding states of emergency.
As outlined above, it should not be ignored that the Committee is subject to some definite limitations in its examination
of emergencies and derogation notification. The most severe of
these is the lack of authority to make on-site investigations, to
receive and hear witness statements, and finally, to receive varying forms of unwritten evidence.' 78 By informal means, the
Committee has sought to circumvent these limitations, though
what is primarily required is constructive reform of procedure
and greater resource allocation to the Committee.
174. See Joan F. Hartman, Working Paperfor the Committee of Experts on the Article 4
Derogation Provision, 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 3, 103-04 (1985).
175. See id.
176. Landinelli, supra note 151.

177. See CHOwDOHURY, supra note 5, at 82-83.
178. See McGoLRICK, supra note 142, at 53-55.
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CONCLUSION

The enjoyment of basic human rights and dignities are particularly limited by situations of emergency. Joan Fitzpatrick has
identified three distinct effects: frequent invasion of absolute
rights, greater restrictions on other fundamental rights, and con1 79
centration of power in the executive arm of government.
Emergencies are also associated with a high incidence of widespread and systematic human rights abuses. At the apex of such
violations are the practices of states in relation to those rights
deemed non-derogable, those which supposedly cannot be suspended in any circumstances. The International Commission of
Jurists has also observed that the excessive invasions of non-derogable rights fails to reflect the overall effect of emergency laws:
Some writers have emphasized the effects of states of emergency on individual rights, particularly the right to be free
from arbitrary deprivation of freedom and the right to a fair
trial. This tends to create a somewhat false image of states of
emergency, for one of their most fundamental characteristics
is precisely the breadth of their impact on society. They typically affect trade union rights, freedom of opinion, freedom
of expression, freedom of association, the right of access to
information and ideas.., not only individual rights but also
collective rights and rights of peoples, such as the
right to
80
development and the right to self-determination.'
Emerging also is a recognition that temporary legislation
employed by states to confront short-term crisis, frequently shift
silently into permanency or become incorporated into the ordinary law, thereby institutionalizing the limitation on individual
rights. International courts and tribunals are the watchgnard for
the protection of fundamental rights. They perform this function by the consensual agreement of states themselves. The response of the courts to emergencies, and state action in respect
of them, is crucial in determining how meaningful the international protection for fundamental rights actually is.
The distinctions between the various courts and tribunals
examined above are important to discern. They tell us that
while we seek to standardize the wording of Human Rights In179. FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 29.
180. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURIsTs, supra note 5, at 417 (footnote omit-
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struments as a means of universalizing rights, we fail to pay sufficient attention to the role of the interpreters of those standards
and the structures which enforce them. Without recognizing
this potential dichotomy in standards we create an obstacle to
the project of normative rationalization of rights protection.
The peril of state over-reaction to situations of crisis is selfevident. The clear and present danger is that the failure of international human rights bodies, given the task of protecting
rights, undermines the integrity of the protective system as a
whole. The positivist achievements of international human
rights law must be equally sustained by creative application and
interpretation of the norms prescribing inalienable rights. State
resort to the justification of exigency is at the apex of this discussion. This is where protection is most meaningful and required.
This is also where divergences in standards are most problematic. To recognize this fact may at least ensure that differences
no longer slip by unnoticed.

